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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should review the record de novo in a 
light most favorable to Celia. Jurisdictional issues which 
overlapped issues on the merits should have been reserved 
until after trial, to avoid dismissing on the merits under 
the guise of determining jurisdiction. 
Celia's briefs have carefully marshalled the 
evidence on furisdiction with specific citations to the 
record. The evidence reveals that Goldwyn has substantial 
contacts with Utah arising out of his role as medical moni-
tor. He trained a Utah doctor to perform liquid silicone 
injections, drafted the form used to explain the risks of 
silicone injections to Celia, approved Celia's admission to 
the silicone experiment, and monitored her treatment. 
The ASPRS also has substantial contacts with Utah. 
It is a joint sponsor or administration with Dow of the 
liquid silicone experiment. As part of the administration, 
the ASPRS selected Utah as a site f.or liquid silicone 
injections and chose a Utah doctor to perform the injections. 
Further, as joint administrators of a multi-state silicone 
experiment, the ASPRS and Dow should be considered as a 
single entity for jurisdictional purposes. Because of these 
contacts, jurisdiction over Goldwyn and the ASPRS is fair and 
reasonable. 
POINT I 
(REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT I) 
CELIA'S BRIEF CONTAINS 
METICULOUS CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
Respondents Goldwyn and the ASPRS assert that the 
trial court should be summarily affirmed becauou "Celia 
failed to factually support her contentions on ^ u*al with 
citations to the record." (Respondents' Brief, Ciatement of 
Issues, p. 1.) Actually, Celia's brief contains a. least 30 
citations to the record to support her facts. Those which 
were not supported by a specific citation were fa:ts which 
seemed indisputably obvious to Celiafs counsel. For example, 
the statement that "Celia received the experimental scries of 
liquid silicone injections from Woolf" is not suppoitsd by a 
specific citation to Dr. Woolf's deposition, R.1813, p. 69-
70. Nevertheless, Celia can add record citations to support 
the obvious and undisputed. Attached as Exhibit A to this 
brief is the Statement of Facts from Celia's opening brief, 
with additional record citations*• 
Defendants' objection is also defective in that it 
fails to specify which of Celia's facts they contend are 
•'•For the Court's convenience, Celia has moved for leave 
to include Exhibit A in a substitute opening brief, to avoid 
the necessity of referring back and forth between the briefs. 
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unsupported. This general, non-specific objection seems 
designed to invite the Court to search Celia's brief for 
possible unsupported facts. However, that job properly 
belongs to defendants' counsel. Having failed to make a 
specific objection, this Court should assume that defendants 
have found no significant facts that are without support in 
the record. 
POINT II 
(REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' BRIEF, P. 10-12) 
THIS COURT SHOULD ACCEPT CELIA'S 
EVIDENCE AS TRUE AND REVIEW THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DISMISSAL FOR ERROR 
Celia pointed out that an appellate court reviews 
de novo a determination of prima facie jurisdiction. Ten 
Mile Industrial Park v. Western Plains Service Corp., 810 
F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1987). Goldwyn and the ASPRS do not 
clearly dispute this standard, and fail to cite or discuss 
Ten Mile. Two Utah cases cited by Goldwyn and the ASPRS 
support Celia's point- Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics 
Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976) states that this Court does 
not reverse a trial court's determination unless "plaintiff 
has shown that it [the trial court] was in error." In other 
words, this Court reviews the trial court's determination for 
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"error," not abuse of discretion or some other standard. 
Andf in Gate Rental Co. v. Wheeler & Co., 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 
1976), the Supreme Court apparently accepted plaintiff's 
evidence (as stated in its brief) as true for purposes of the 
appeal. This is consistent with the numerous federal 
authorities cited by Celia. (Appellant's Brief, p. 13.) 
Thus, this Court should review the record de novo in a light 
most favorable to Celia. 
POINT III 
(REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT II,A) 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
DECIDED WHETHER GOLDWYN AND THE ASPRS "CAUSED" CELIA'S 
INJURIES 
Utah has jurisdiction over foreign defendants v;ho 
cause injury within this state. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-
24(3)2. Celia alleged that Goldwyn and the ASPRS caused her 
injuries in Utah in several ways. 
First, Celia claims the consent form inadequately 
disclosed known risks of liquid silicone injections. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 10.) Dr, Woolf testified he simply 
^Because Celia relies on §78-27-24(3), respondents' 
argument that they have never done buisness in Utah (§78-27-
24(1)) or owned property in Utah (§78-27-24(4) or contracted 
to supply goods and services in Utah (§78-27-24;2) ) is 
irrelevant. 
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read the consent form to Celia. (Woolf depo., p. 59, 
R.1813.) The only disclosure which the consent form makes is 
that surgical removal may be required if Celia's boay "does 
not tolerate" silicone. (Consent form, paragraph 2(e), 
R.1811, Celia Anderson depo., Exhibit 1.) The word 'toler-
ate" appears to be a euphemism for "severe chronic inflam-
matory reaction", a well-known risk of liquid silicone 
injections. (Rule 56(f) Affidavit, R.1590.) While the 
consent form states that surgical removal is a possibility, 
it leaves out the fact that "once silicone has been injected 
into tissue, it cannot be wholly or even in good part 
evacuated by incision into the injected site." (Rathjen 
depo., R.1812, Exhibit 4, p. 26; see also R. 1608.) A jury 
could readily find that the consent form fails to meet 
federal standards which require disclosure of "the hazards 
involved." 21 C.F.R. §130.37(h)(1967). A jury could also 
conclude that Celia's injury was "caused" by the inadequate 
consent form. 
Second, Celia claims that Goldwyn should not have 
admitted her to the experimental liquid silicone injection 
program. Admission to the experimental program was limited 
to "the most severe cases of . . . 1ipodystrophy3." (Rathjen 
^Loss of facial fat. (Goldwyn depo., R. 1810, p.20). 
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depo. Ro 1812, Exhibit 3, p. 25.) However, Celia's doctor 
testified that her lipodystrophy was "relatively mild*" 
(Leonard depo., R. 1811, p.70). Goldwyn has admitted that he 
reviewed Celia's facial photographs before admitting her to 
the experiment- (Goldwyn depo., R.1810, p. 30-34.) If, in 
fact, Goldwyn should not have admitted Celia to the experi-
ment, a jury could conclude that his negligence "caused" 
Celia's injuries in Utah. 
Celia pointed out that a plaintiff should not have 
her case dismissed on the merits under the guise of a 
jurisdictional determination. Schramm v. Oakes, 352 F.2d 
143, 149 (10th Cir. 1965). (Appellant's Brief, p. 18). 
Defendants have failed to answer this point, and apparently 
concede it. 
The issue of whether Goldwyn or the ASPRS "caused" 
injury in Utah under §78-24-24(3)) is identical to the issue 
of proximate cause on the merits. When the trial court 
decided that Goldwyn and the ASPRS did not "cause" Celia's 
injury under §78-27-24(3), Celia was deprived of a jury trial 
on the merits of her case. Because the jurisdictional issue 
was intertwined with the merits of Celia's case, the 
jurisdictional determination should have been reserved until 
after trial on the merits. 
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The issue of whether Goldwyn or the ASPRS "caused" 
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POINT IV 
(REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT II,B) 
BECAUSE GOLDWYN HAS SUBSTANTIAL 
CONTACTS WITH UTAH, IN PERSONAM 
JURISDICTION OVER HIM IS PROPER 
1. Goldwyn Voluntarily Assumed "Continuing Obligations" to 
Celia in Utah. 
In personam jurisdiction is proper where a 
defendant "has created 'continuing obligations' between 
himself and residents of the forum- . ." Burger King Corp. 
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476; 105 S.Ct. 2174; 85 L.Ed.2d 
528 (1985) citing Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 
U.S. 643, 648 (1950). Goldwyn asserts that he has "no 
meaningful relationship" to Celia and Utah. The facts in the 
records however, belie that claim. 
Goldwyn created a substantial obligation TO Celia 
when he assumed the duty of deciding whether to admit her to 
an experimental medical program. As Dr. Woolf testified, 
[Goldwyn] was the only one who made the 
decision whether there was medical 
necessity for [Celia's] injection. 
(Woolf depo.f R.1813, p. 29.) This decision was not a 
procedural formality; before admitting Celia to the program, 
Goldwyn reviewed Celia's medical history, her photographs, 
reviewed the consent form, her patient information form, her 
laboratory data, and her x-rays. (Goldwyn depo., R.1810, p. 
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30-34.) Having assumed the responsibility of making the 
decision, he had a duty and obligation to use reasonable care 
in doing so. 
Goldwyn quibbles whether to use the word "conclude" 
or "diagnose." (Respondents' Brief, p. 15-16.) He asserts 
that he "never diagnosed [Celia] but merely reviewed medical 
information in Massachusetts." (Id. p. 16.) Goldwyn fails 
to explain why he was reviewing the medical information, 
namely, to make an independent professional judgment 
(diagnosis) whether to authorize a Utah doctor to inject a 
Utah patient with an experimental medical treatment. 
Goldwyn further suggests that it is critical for 
jurisdictional purposes to determine whether he had a doctor-
patient relationship with Celia. (Respondents' Brief, p. 
15.) Celia disagrees. Whether Goldwyn was a doctor, lawyer, 
bureaucrat, or something else, he assumed a duty and 
obligation to Celia to properly admit her to the experiment. 
Goldwyn's obligation to Celia did not end once he 
admitted Celia to the experiment. Dow's letter to the ASPRS 
states that Goldwyn ". . . [m]ust be available to answer 
inquiries from investigators relative to problems, techni-
que. . ." (Rathjen's letter, R. 1628, Paragraph 3.) 
Further, Goldwyn was "to be the initial contact relative to 
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complications," (Ld. at Paragraph 4) and was to "review any 
submission to the FDA relative to clinical safety and 
efficiency. • . " (_Id. at Paragraph 10). 
The clinical protocol also provided for an ongoing 
monitoring obligation: 
H. Adverse Reactions 
All adverse reactions occurring during 
the study should be reported on the Gross 
Clinical Observation Sheet (See Appendix 
H) . Unexpected or unusually severe ad-
verse reactions will be reported to the 
medical monitor and sponsor immediately 
by telephone so that action can be taken 
and adverse reaction reports rendered to 
the FDA (Form 369) (See Appendix J). 
I. Monitoring of this Program 
At regular intervals throughout the 
scheduled three-year duration of this 
program, a representative of the 
sponsor's monitor team will visit all 
investigators to review case report forms 
and other corresponding portions of the 
patient's original office medical 
records. These inspections are for the 
purpose of verifying adherence to the IND 
protocol and the completeness and 
accuracy of the data being entered on the 
report forms. 
(Rathjen depof R. 1812, Exhibit 3, p. 32). (Emphasis added). 
In response, Goldwyn points to his "scant cor-
respondence" with Woolf. (Respondents' Brief, p. 15; R. 1633 
to 1652). In light of his monitoring obligation, Celia 
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regards this as evidence of negligence, not lack of jurisdic-
tion. 
2. Goldwyn Had Other Substantial Contacts with Utah* 
Goldwynfs first Utah contact occurred prior to 
Celia's treatment. One of his duties as monitor was to "be 
the faculty Dean for the training program" held at Ann 
Arbor, Michigan. (Rathjen's letter, R. 1628, paragraph 11.) 
Goldwyn taught the doctors (including Woolf) what the patient 
selection criteria were, and how to inject silicone. 
(Goldwyn depo., R. 1810, p. 60-62.) At least by this time, 
Goldwyn knew he was training a Utah doctor who would inject 
Utah patients in Utah. Goldwyn had a duty to use due care in 
that training program. 
Goldwyn also helped draft the consent form used to 
secure Celia's consent. (Rathjen depo., R.1812, p. 106.) 
Not only was it foreseeable that the doctors (including 
Woolf) might use it, they were required to use it. (Woolf 
depo., R. 1813, p.27). Further, Goldwyn was required to 
ensure that the patients (including Celia) had signed it, 
(Goldwyn depo., R.1810, p. 30 "I had to be sure the patient 
[Celia] had signed the consent form"). Under these cir-
cumstances, Goldwyn cannot claim to be surprised that the 
Utah doctor he trained (Woolf) used the consent form he 
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drafted to secure consent from a Utah patient (Celia). The 
reliance Woolf and Celia placed on the consent form cannot be 
characterized as "random" or "fortuitous," as Goldwyn now 
suggests. Nor are Goldwyn's contacts with Utah "unintention-
al"; each contact of Goldwyn's came about through conscious 
action. 
Goldwyn also urges that he should be absolved of. 
contact with Utah because the consent form was actually given 
to Woolf by Dow. (Respondents' Brief, p. 19.) Adopting this 
logic would insulate any manufacturer, securities promoter 
or other defendant from liability so long as someone else 
actually distributes the misleading owner's manual, prospec-
tus or other document. Such a rule would rob Utah citizens 
of important protection of Utah courts. 
Goldwyn also argues that there is "absolutely no 
factual support for the allegation that. . .the consent form 
was the source of Celia's injury." (Respondents' Brief, p. 
20.) This is a restatement of defendants' prior argument 
that they did not "cause" injury in Utah. See Point III, 
supra. 
Goldwyn also suggests that the consent form is not 
a jurisdictional contact because Goldwyn owed Celia "no duty 
to obtain informed consent." (Respondent's Brief, p. 21, 
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22). This argument is raised for the first time on appeal 
and should not be considered now. Insley Mfg. Corp. v. 
Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986). 
Furthermore, the "duty" issue goes to the merits, i.e. 
whether Celia has stated a claim against Goldwyn. However, 
this Court cannot rule on the merits if it has no jurisdic-
tion. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682; 66 S.Ct. 773; 90 
Ed. 939 (1946); ("it is well settled that the failure to 
state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the 
merits and not for dismissal for want of jurisdiction.") 
Goldwyn also overlooks an important factual point: 
he may not have had a duty to obtain in formal consent 
himself, but he certainly had a duty to properly draft the 
consent form used by Woolf to obtain informed consent. 
Goldwyn raises the spectre of limitless jurisdic-
tion over "secretaries, printers, or others . . ."if this 
Court finds jurisdiction over him. (Respondents' Brief, 
p.21). Again, he overlooks the obvious factual distinction 
between himself and others. Goldwyn was responsible for the 
content of the consent form. His secretaries, printers and 
other assistants had no responsibility for content. In an 
analogous setting, those who are responsible for the content 
of a securities prospectus are subject to liability and 
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jurisdiction, where the printer who prints the prospectus is 
obviously not^. Jurisdiction over the drafter of the consent 
form used by Celia is fair and proper. 
POINT V 
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT II,C) 
JURISDICTION OVER THE ASPRS IS PROPER 
BECAUSE IT JOINTLY ADMINISTERED AN 
INTERSTATE MEDICAL EXPERIMENT 
1. The ASPRS Was a Joint Sponsor of the Silicone Experi-
ment • 
The ASPRS was a joint sponsor of an inter-state 
silicone experiment that included a Utah doctor and Utah 
patients• Arthur Rathjen^ testified: 
Q. Do you remember what was said on 
the subject of who would be the sponsor 
of the FDA, who would be the sponsor of 
the study? 
A. The discussion [with the ASORS 
in Los Angeles 1 was centered around the 
fact that Dow Corning was not going to be 
the sole sponsor of the study and that it 
would be a combined sponsorship of the 
ASPRS and Dow Corning. 
4
 A prospectus warns investors of risk to their money; a 
consent form warns patients of risk to their bodies. 
5Director of Dow Corning Services to Medical Research. 
(Rathjen depo.f R. 1812, p.5). 
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Q. Well, look at Page 4, item D-2. 
Does that refresh your recollection of 
what was said on the subject of who would 
be the sponsor? 
A. No. Although it appears as 
though we were a single sponsor, we were 
not the single sponsor. We made it clear 
that we wouldn't be. We had an obliga-
tion with the FDA because of the fact 
that an NDA had been submitted and that 
our records on the material were on 
record in Washingtonf and therefore, we 
had an obligation to communicate and 
coordinate with the FDA. But it had to 
do with the material and not the 
sponsorship or the study as taking sole 
responsibility for the study. 
(Rathjen depo.f R. 1812, p. 101-102.) (Emphasis added). 
Rathjen explained the roles of the ASPRS and Dow in 
the study as follows: 
Q. Well, in that regard, can you 
tell me your understanding of what the 
duties and responsibilities of the 
American Society of Plastic and Recon-
structive Surgeons are as opposed to the 
duties and responsibilities of Dow 
Corning with respect to the 1978 
amendment to the IDE? You say it was a 
joint study? 
A. The ASPRS chose the medical 
monitor, the ASPRS chose the 25 inves-
tigators, the ASPRS looked into the 
subject of patient consent form, the 
ASPRS looked into the subject of 
institutional review by the individual 
investigators, the ASPRS took on the 
responsibility of the liaison through the 
ISPAC Committee, and the ASPRS would help 
assume responsibility in attempting to 
get the clinical data from the inves-
14 
tigators. And if there were any changes 
in the clinical investigators, anybody 
dropped out, anybody had any difficul-
ties, why they would take care of their 
own, that it was not Dow Coming's 
responsibility to administer or police 
the plastic surgeons. The ASPRS would 
police their own. And that may not be a 
right word to use "police," but what I 
mean is to coordinate or administer or 
work with to see that all of the 
responsibilities were carried out. 
Q. Now, if ASPRS was going to do 
all of that, what was Dow Coming's 
responsibility with respect to the 197 8 
amendment to the IDE, your share of the 
responsibility? 
A. Coming's responsibility was the 
collection and the depository of the 
records, taking the photographs and 
duplicating them, keeping the files on 
the patients that were administered into 
the study, keeping the records of ampules 
and the shipments of MDX4-4011 to the 
individual investigators and complying 
with the regulations set forth by the FDA 
in conducting a study. 
(Rathjen depo. R.1812, p. 102-103.) (Emphasis added). 
Goldwyn, the medical monitor, gave similar 
testimony: 
Q. Was the application for permission 
to conduct a clinical study a joint 
application by Dow Corning and the 
society, or was it just Dow Coming's 
application? 
A. The FDA was aware that it was a 
three-pronged thing — the FDA, ASPRS, 
and Dow Corning — so that the FDA had 
spoken at the American Society of Plastic 
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Surgeons' meeting. I don't know how the 
original form went in, but everyone in 
the American Society expected that it 
involved the American Society, Dow 
Corning and the FDA. 
We did not think we were working for 
Dow Corning and not for the FDA. Almost 
everyone in that study really did it 
because we were members of ASPRS. 
The minutes prepared by the ASPRS (R.1672) indicate 
that ASPRS agreement was required on: 
(a) Consent form (Paragraph 12); 
(b) Medical monitor selection (Paragraph 8(a)); 
(c) Investigator [doctor] selection (Paragraph 
- 8(b)); 
(d) All pertinent documents, manuals, forms 
(Paragraph 12)); 
(e) Any publicity regarding the program (Para-
graphs 7(d) and 10(a)). 
In conclusion, the testimony of Rathjen and 
Goldwyn, considered with the minutes of the meetings between 
Dow and the ASPRS (Exhibits A, B and C to Celia's opening 
brief)6 clearly belie the post facto claim of the ASPRS that 
6The ASPRS's objection to consideration of these 
documents is tucked away in a footnote on p. 33 of its brief. 
It claims a "standing objection" to the documents. However, 
this "standing objection" was first raised on appeal. By 
failing to object below, it has waived its objection (if 
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it merely had a "gratuitous advisory role regarding certain 
aspects of the protocol. . ." (Respondents' Brief, p. 25.) 
The evidence is that the ASPRS was a co-sponsor and co-
administrator with Dow of the liquid silicone study. 
2. The ASPRS Clearly Directed its Activities at Utah. 
Jurisdiction is proper where a foreign defendant's 
activities "are purposefully directed toward residents of 
another state." Asahi Metal Ind. v. Sup. Ct. of Sonoma City, 
U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1033, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 
(1987). The ASPRS clearly directed its activity (the 
silicone experiment) toward Utah residents. The ASPRS 
specifically selected Dr. Woolf to inject silicone for the 
Salt Lake area. Dr. Woolf testified: 
. . .Since we were doing a major part of 
the pediatric surgery, I was asked by Dr. 
Muskrave who was then president of the 
Society of Plastic and Reconstructive 
Surgeons if I would accept that position 
for this part of the Intermountain 
States. 
(Woolf depo., R.1813, p. 6-7.) The ASPRS also specifically 
chose the Salt Lake area as a site for liquid silicone 
injections: 
any). Hobelman Motors, Inc. v. Allred, 685 P.2d 544 (Utah 
1984). Since the witnesses necessary to authenticate the 
documents are adverse, and not available to Celia, she would 
simply have filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit to keep them in the 
record (had there been an objection). 
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7. In a very general and noncom-
mitted way, Dr. Peterson and 
Dallas Whaley made a first 
attempt to identify areas/reg-
ions that might be considered 
for location of investigators. 
This list included: 
1. Portland/Seattle 
2. San Francisco 
3. Los Angeles 
4. San Diego. 
5. Phoenix/Tucson 
6. Salt Lake City 
* * * 
(ASPRS minutes, R.1670)(emphasis added). In light of this 
evidence, the ASPRS' claim that "there is no purposefully 
established relationship between [it] and this forum" 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 38) is mistaken. The evidence 
indicates a conscious, purposeful direction of the silicone 
experiment to include Utah. 
3. The ASPRS Helped Draft the Consent Form. 
The ASPRS claims it did not draft the consent form. 
(Schedler Affidavit, Paragraph 4, R.1444.) Goldwyn claims he 
did not prepare the consent form. (Goldwyn depo., R.1810, p. 
42-43.) However, Rathjen testified that the ASPRS and 
Goldwyn prepared the consent form: 
Q. Now, you've testified what Dow 
Corning was to do, now tell me the other 
half of the coin. What was the ASPRS to 
do? What was their scope of respon-
18 
sibility with respect to the consent 
form? 
A. I testified this morning, I believe I 
testified this morning, to the best of my 
recollection, that the subject of the 
informed patient consent [form] was to be 
prepared or was prepared by Dr. Goldwyn 
and by members of the ISPAC Committee of 
the ASPRS with recommendations submitted 
by some of our investigators and by our 
legal counsel at Dow Corning. And that 
it, to the best of my recollection, was 
put into a form, a draft, if you will, by 
Dr. Goldwyn and circulated around. And 
when it was approved, it came back to me 
and I had it typed up. 
(Rathjen depo., R.1812, p. 105-106.) (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court was faced with a clear factual 
dispute whether the ASPRS helped draft the consent form. 
This issue overlaps the liability question (who drafted the 
consent form) and thus, should not have been decided at the 
jurisdictional stage. See Point III, supra. Further, the 
consent form is an added contact with Utah. The ASPRS knew 
Utah would be a site for silicone injections because the 
ASPRS selected Salt Lake City and Dr. Woolf to do injections. 
Thus, it helped prepare a consent form it knew would be used 
in Utah. 
ASPRS argues that because its arrangement with Dow 
lacked all the elements of a profit-making joint venture, it 
cannot be considered "a jural entity" with Dow for jurisdic-
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tional purposes. Cf. Aigner v. Bell Helicopters, Inc. 86 
F.R.D. 532 (N.D. 111. 1980)- However, the presence of a 
formal partnership or joint venture is not essential to 
jurisdiction. In exercising jurisdiction: 
". • . courts have focused on the 
realities of the relationship in question 
rather than the formalities of agency 
law. Galgay v. Bulletin Co., 504 F.2d 
1062, 1065; (2d. Cir. 1974); Bulova Watch 
Co., Inc. v. K. Hattori & Co. Ltd., 508 
F.Supp 1322, 1346 (E.D.N.T. 1981). 
* * * 
. . . we hold that where there is joint 
control of a business enterprise—similar 
to that existing in a partnership or 
joint venture—enough control has been 
shown to establish prima facie this 
particular element of agency to satisfy 
long arm jurisdiction. 
Cutco Ind. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 366, (2d Cir. 1986). 
Celia suggests that joint administration of the multi-state 
silicone program should be sufficient control to treat both 
Dow and the ASPRS as a single jural entity for jurisdic-
tional purposes. 
The ASPRS advances the argument that jurisdiction 
is defeated because there was no profit generated by the 
program. (Respondents' Brief, p.34-36). This argument would 
deny Utah jurisdiction over any non-profit joint activity. 
Jurisdiction should not hang on so slender a thread. 
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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected the 
ASPRS's argument: 
The district court also concluded that 
FIBA's contacts with Colorado through 
ABA/USA were insignificant. It based its 
conclusion in part on the fact that the 
concurrent activity of FIBA and ABA/USA 
was not a joint "commercial" endeavor. 
However, the due process clause does not 
require that a foreign defendant's 
contacts with the forum state be 
commercial in nature. See Nova Biomedi-
cal Corp. v. Moller, 629, F.2d 190, 193 
(1st Cir. 1980)(state long-arm statute 
extending jurisdiction to federal 
constitutional limits not limited to 
commercial activity by defendant); 
McClean v. Church of Scientology, 538 
FoSupp 545, 549-50 (M.D. Fla. 1982)(com-
mercial transaction for pecuniary benefit 
not required under liberally construed 
long-arm statute). Even though FIBA and 
ABA/USA are not involved in a commercial 
endeavor, FIBA may still conduct sig-
nificant activity in Colorado through 
ABA/USA for purposes of long-arm 
jurisdiction. 
Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of U.S.A., 744 F.2d 731, 
734-735 (10th Cir. 1984). Jurisdiction extends over joint 
non-commercial activity as well as commercial activity. 
The ASPRS's claim that there was no contract with 
Dow is refuted by Rathjen's testimony that the ASPRS agreed 
to be a joint sponsor. (Rathjen depo., R. 1812, 0.101). 
Further, the minutes of the ASPRS state: 
As the negotiations developed, many areas 
and topics of concern were identified and 
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explained. Agreement was reached in 
every instance. The essential features 
of the program are: [etc.] 
(ASPRS minutes, R. 1670)(Emphasis added). 
The agreement provided for joint control of the 
program by the ASPRS. (Appellants' Brief, p. 3,4). This 
joint control was actually exercised. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.7). The claim of the ASPRS that Dow retained a veto right 
over some aspects is not inconsistent with the position of 
the ASPRS as a joint administration of the overall program. 
As a joint sponsor, jurisdiction over the ASPRS is fair and 
reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Goldwyn created substantial contacts and obliga-
tions with Celia when he acted as medical monitor. The 
United States Supreme Court has cautioned that "the Due 
Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial 
shield to avoid interstate obligations voluntarily assumed." 
Burger King, supra at 2183. 
The ASPRS purposefully directed its activities 
toward Utah when it selected Utah as a site for injections 
and chose a Utah doctor to perform them. This "purposeful 
direction" satisfies due process. Asahi Metal supra at 1033. 
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Furthermore, as a joint sponsor of the program with Dow, the 
ASPRS cannot now abandon its interstate responsibility. 
Jurisdiction should be exercised over Goldwyn and the ASPRS 
for Celia's protection, 
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EXHIBIT A 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding, 
as a matter of law, that defendants Goldwyn and the ASPRS 
did not cause injury to Celia in Utah? 
2. Was the trial court's conclusion that juris-
diction over Goldwyn and the ASPRS would violate federal due 
process correct? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Background. 
Dow Corning tested liquid silicone for over ten 
years from 1965 to 1975- (See generally Goldwyn deposition, 
R.1810, Deposition Exhibit 13, Letter of Rathjen, 10/28/33; 
Rathjen depo., R.1812, p. 83-84,) In 1975, the FDA approved 
liquid silicone for the most severe cases of facial 
deformity. Dow elected not to market silicone under those 
restrictions, (IA-) T^e plastic surgeon community 
(principal users of silicone) was upset at the lack of 
availability of silicone. (Id.) The ASPRS, on behalf of 
the plastic surgeon community, approached Dow to devise a 
formula to make liquid silicone available. (Id.) 
2. Agreement to co-sponsor liquid silicone study. 
The formula worked out by Dow and the S^I RS 
involved joint sponsorship of a new "study" of liquid 
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silicone. (Rathjen depo., R..1812, p. 101.) This agreement 
was worked out in a series of meetings in 1976 and xJll, 
(Rathjen Depo., R.1812, p. 84-103.) The final meeting wa-.-. LJ 
March 24, 1977 in Los Angeles. (Id-, p. 99.) Proposed 
Minutes of the meeting drafted by ASPRS and Dow show Lhit 
this was a formal, arms-length negotiation and agreement. 
(See ASPRS minutes of 4/18/77, R.1669, attached hereto t; 
Exhibit A; Dow Corning minutes of 4/11/77, R.1677, Exhibit: B 
hereto; Dow Corning reply minutes of 5/18/77, Exhibit C 
hereto, R.1681.) 
Construing the minutes together, the essential 
terms of the agreement are clear. Dow supplied the sili-
cone, and the ASPRS supplied the monitor and selects 
physicians to perform the experiment (called the inv-sstiq.* 
tors). Dow and the ASPRS would jointly pay the expenses o«. 
the medical monitor. (Exhibit C, R.1683, Paragraph 3,r.) 
They would exercise joint control over all of the docuivexc. 
to be used in the study. Agreement by the ASPRS and Dow was 
required on "all pertinent documents, L o rms , manu &.;. 6 u n J 
patient releases." (Exhibit A, Paragraph 12, R.1672). 
The following is a summary of the major aspects of 
the study over which the ASPRS and Dow were to share con-
trol: 
(a) Consent form (patient release) (Exhibit A, 
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Paragraph 12); 
(b) Medical monitor selection (Exhibit A, 
Paragraph 8(a))? 
(c) Investigators selection (Exhibit A, 
Paragraph 8(b)); 
(d) Medical monitor - payment (Exhibit C, 
Paragraph B,I) ; 
(e) Publications, panel appearances, seminars re: 
liquid silicone (Exhibit A, Paragr *P.IS 7(d) 
and 10(a)); 
(f) All pertinent documents, manuals, fens 
(Exhibit A, Paragraphs 12); 
(g) Medical monitor guide book (duties) (Exhibit-
A, Paragraph 4(d)); 
(h) Training seminar for investigators (Exhibit 
A, Paragraph 6); 
(i) Obtaining IRB approval1 (Rathjen Depo., 
R.1812,, p. 102-103) ; 
(j) Investigation location selection (Id). 
^IRB: Insittutional REview Board—a body formally 
designated to approve, oversee and (if necessary) terminate 
experimental research on humans. See Robertson, The Lav; of 
Institutional Review Boards, 26 U.C-L-A. Law Rev. 48-/ 
(1979), fn.4. 
4 
3. Activities of Medical Monitor« 
Dr. Goldwyn was appointed by the ASPR3 to be 
monitor of the injectable liquid silicone experiment 
(Goldwyn depo., R.181G, p.70, "I was asked by the president 
of ASPRS"). Goldwyn's duties as monitor are partially set 
forth in a letter from Arthur Rathjen (Dow Medical Liason) 
to Ross Musgrave (ASPRS)• These duties include: 
1. Act as Faculty Dean in training the inves-
tigators in the study; 
2. Approve the admission of each patient into 
the experiment; 
3. Answer inquiries from investigators regarding 
problems; 
4. Be the initial contact regarding complica-
tions; 
5. Assist in biannual reports to the FDA? 
6. Make monthly reports to Dow on patient 
treatment; 
7. Review any submission to the FDA relating to 
the safety and efficiency of injectable 
liquid silicone. 
(See letter from Rathjen, 1/7/77, R.1628, attached as 
Exhibit D.) 
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A critical duty which Goldwyn fulfilled was to 
help draft the consent form, (Rathjen depo., R.1812, p.106 
". . . The informed patient consent [form] was . . . pre-
pared by Dr. Goldwyn and . . . the ASPRS . . • ") . This 
consent form had to outline "the hazards involved" with 
injectable liquid silicone. 21 C.F.R. §130.37(h) (1967). 
(Exhibit E hereto.) This consent form was the one used to 
obtain Celia's consent to the treatment. (Celia Anderson 
depo, R.1811, Depo. Exhibit 1, Exhibit F to this brief.) 
The protocol which controlled the silicone experi-
ment also defines the monitor's duties by reference to 
federal regulations (Protocol, 9/2/77, p.2, R.1630, 
"[Goldwyn's] role as medical monitor will be that defined by 
FDA regulations."). While these are not specifically 
identified, presumably they had reference to the regulations 
proposed in 1977 defining a monitor's role. Under these 
regulations, a monitor must "assure that the investigator 
understands the investigational status of the test article, 
understands the nature of the protocol or investigational 
plans and controls, and understands and accepts his obliga-
tions in conducting the clinical investigation . . . " 42 
Fed.Reg. No. 187, p. 49623 (9/27/77). (Exhibit G to this 
Brief.) After the investigation begins, the monitor assures 
the investigator's "adherence to the protocol," "maintenance 
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of adequate records," and "timely, adequate and accurate" 
reporting. Ijd. at 49624. The monitor "shall be available 
for consultation at the request of the investigator. The 
monitor shall act as the liaison and communication link 
between the sponsor [Dow and the ASPRS] and the 
investigator." Id. 
Goldwyn performed each of the above duties with 
regard to Celia Anderson. Only Dr. Goldwyn could authorize 
Celia's injection with liquid silicone. Dr. Woolf has 
testified: 
[Goldwyn] was the one who made the deci-
sion whether there was medical necessity 
for the injection. 
(Woolf depo., R.1813, p.29.) In deciding whether th^re was 
medical necessity to inject liquid silicone, Dr. G:>ldwyn 
reviewed Celia's medical history, her photographs, ensured 
that she had signed a consent form, reviewed Celia's pacient 
form, her laboratory data, and her x-rays. (Goldwyn depo., 
R. 1810, pp.30-34.) Based on his review, Goldwyn diagnosed 
Celia as having severe lipodystrophy (loss of fat in the 
face), and specifically approved Celia for injection with 
injectable liquid silicone. (Goldwyn depo., R.1810, 
pp.110-11; Goldwyn letter, 4/19/78, R.1652.) 
Goldwyn also had the responsibility to oversee the 
training program that Dr. Woolf attended. (Exhibit D, 
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R.1628, Paragraph 11.) Goldwyn taught the doctors 
(including Woolf) what the patient selection criteria were. 
This training program was held in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
(Goldwyn Depo., R.1810, p. 60-62.) 
After Goldwyn's approval, Celia received the 
experimental series of liquid silicone injections from 
Woolf. (Woolf Depo., R.1813, p. 69-70.) She suffered 
increasingly painful inflammation to her cheek. (.Id., at p. 
70-111.) Eventually, she underwent major reconstructive 
surgery to partially remove the silicone embedded in her 
face. (Id. at p. 112-122; Leonard depo., R.1811, p. 50-54.) 
When Celia began to show an adverse reaction, Dr. 
Woolf reported to Goldwyn. Thereafter, Woolf regularly 
updated Goldwyn on Celia's treatment, (R.1633 to 1652). 
This continued for several years. At a later stage, Dr. 
Leonard replaced Dr. Woolf as the treating physician. 
(Leonard depo., R.1811, p. 20-21.) 
4. Actual Control of ASPRS Over the Study. 
The ASPRS in fact exercised joint control over the 
administration of the study. The ASPRS selected the inves-
tigators who would inject liquid silicone. (Rathjen depo., 
R.1812, p.102; Goldwyn depo., R.1810, pp.60,116). Of 
course, this included Dr. Woolf. The ASPRS chose the 
medical monitor, Dr. Goldwyn. (Goldwyn depo., R.1810, p.70; 
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Rathjen depo., R.1812, p.102.) The ASPRS ensured that the 
investigators obtained approval from an Institutional Review 
Board. (Rathjen depo.f R.1812, p.102.) Most importantly, 
the ASPRS helped draft the consent form. (Id. p.102,) In 
summary, the ASPRS was to "police" the study. (Ijd- p.103.) 
The ASPRS was held out as a co-sponsor or joint 
sponsor of the liquid silicone experiment. For example, the 
letter sent to Dr. Woolf outlining the experiment represent-
ed the training seminar and "investigational program" as 
jointly administered by the ASPRS and Dow. (See 9/26/77 
letter of Dow, R.1686, Exhibit D.) And Arthur Rathjen 
testified that the ASPRS was a joint sponsor of the liquid 
silicone program. (Rathjen depo., R.1812, p. 101.) 
5. ASPRS and Goldwyn Actions Directed Toward Utah. 
The ASPRS and Dow jointly participated in select-
ing the geographic locations for the injection of liquid 
silicone. The actual selection was made by Dr. Peterson, 
President of ASPRS, and Dallas Whaley, Executive Vice 
President of the ASPRS. (Exhibit B, R.1677, Paragraph F, 
7.) 
Salt Lake City, Utah was specifically selected as a loca-
tion for liquid silicone injection. Dr. Woolf, a Utah 
doctor, was chosen by the ASPRS to inject liquid silicone in 
Utah. (Woolf depo. R.1813, p.6-7.) 
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Thus, the ASPRS knew that the consent form it 
helped draft would be sent to Utah, and used by a Utah 
doctor, (a member of the ASPRS) to explain liquid silicone 
injections to a Utah patient. The investigators materials 
were probably prepared at least in part by the ASPRS. This 
material was used to inform Dr. Woolf of the nature, hazards 
and risks of injectable liquid silicone. 
Goldwyn knew when he became monitor that he would 
be approving silicone injections of patients in Utah. He 
helped draft the consent form he knew would be sent to those 
Utah patients. He oversaw the training given to the Utah 
doctor who was to inject those patients. 
6. Defects in the Consent Form. 
Celia suffered a severe chronic inflammatory 
reaction to the liquid silicone. The risk of such a reac-
tion was well known to Dow and ASPRS. (Rule 56(f) Affidavit 
of Daniel Bertch, R.1590.) Previous patients injected with 
liquid silicone had a reaction to silicone severe enough to 
require surgery. Id. The only disclosure of that iis> in 
the consent form is the statement that surgical removal may 
be required if Celia's body "does not tolerate" silicone. 
(Consent form, Exhibit E, Paragraph 2(e).) What the word 
"tolerate" means is not explained, nor is the suffering 
which accompanies such a reaction explained. 
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Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of surgical 
removal was admitted by Dow to the F.D.A. (Rathjei depo., 
R.1812, Exhibit 4, p. 25.) It is impossible to remjve all 
the injected silicone, and the body continues to react to the 
silicone left after surgery* Of course, surgical removal may 
leave severely disfiguring scars or require restoration of 
the removed tissue by skin grafts. This is not explained in 
the consent form. 
Finally, the consent form implies that the injected 
silicone can be removed by needle (aspiration). Of course, 
that is impossible. (Leonard depo. R.1811. p. 56.) 
10a 
